Byzantine Studies

The military achievements of the emperors Nikephoros Phokas, John Tzimiskes, and Basil II brought the Byzantine Empire to the height of its power by the early eleventh century. This volume presents new editions and translations of two military treatises--the Praecepta militaria of Nikephoros Phokas and the revised version included in the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos--outlining the tactical system used by Byzantine armies in campaigns against Muslim forces in Cilicia and Syria. Products of experienced soldiers, the texts offer a realistic view of Byzantine warfare and reveal the sophistication of Byzantine military science. Eric McGeer places the treatises in military historical context; explores the factors that led the Byzantine army to fight as it did; and investigates morale, discipline, and leadership--all of which determined the difference between failure and success.

The late Byzantine period was a time characterized by both civil strife and foreign invasion, framed by two cataclysmic events: the fall of Constantinople to the western Europeans in 1204 and again to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Mark C. Bartusis here opens an extraordinary window on the Byzantine Empire during its last centuries by providing the first comprehensive treatment of the dying empire's military. Although the Byzantine army was highly visible, it was increasingly ineffective in preventing the incursion of western European crusaders into the Aegean, the advance of the Ottoman Turks into Europe, and the slow decline and eventual fall of the thousand-year Byzantine Empire. Using all the available Greek, western European, Slavic, and Turkish sources, Bartusis describes the evolution of the army both as an institution and as an instrument of imperial policy. He considers the army's size, organization, administration, and the varieties of soldiers, and he examines Byzantine feudalism and the army's impact on society and the economy. In its extensive use of soldier companies composed of foreign mercenaries, the Byzantine army had many parallels with those of western Europe; in the final analysis, Bartusis contends, the death of Byzantium was attributable more to a shrinking fiscal base than to any lack of creative military thinking on the part of its leaders.

This book explores the professional and social lives of the soldiers who served in the army of the Byzantine Empire in the sixth century. More than just a fighting force, this army was the setting in which hundreds of thousands of men forged relationships and manoeuvred for promotion. The officers of this force, from famous generals like Belisarius and Narses to lesser-known men like Buzes and Artabanes, not only fought battles but also crafted social networks and cultivated their relationships with their emperor, fellow officers, families, and subordinate soldiers. Looming in the background were differences in identity, particularly between Romans and those they identified as barbarians. Drawing on numerical evidence and stories from sixth-century authors who understood the military, Justinian's Men highlights a sixth-century Byzantine army that was vibrant, lively, and full of individuals working with and against each other.

A Complete Overview of One of the Most Important Military Forces in the History of the World The Byzantine Art of War explores the military history of the thousand-year empire of the eastern Mediterranean, Byzantium. Throughout its history the empire faced a multitude of challenges from foreign invaders seeking to plunder its wealth and to occupy its lands, from the deadly Hunnic hordes of Attila, to the Arab armies of Islam, to the western Crusaders bent on carving out a place in the empire or its former lands. In order to survive the Byzantines relied on their army that was for centuries the only standing, professional force in Europe. Leadership provided another key to survival; Byzantine society produced a number of capable strategic thinkers and tacticians--and several brilliant ones. These officers maintained a level of professionalism and organization inherited and adapted from Roman models. The innovations of the Byzantine military reforms of the sixth century included the use of steppe nomad equipment and tactics, the most important of which was the refinement of the Roman mounted archer. Strategy and tactics evolved in the face of victory and defeat; the shock of the Arab conquests led to a sharp decline in the number and quality of imperial forces. By the eighth and ninth centuries Byzantine commanders mastered the art of the small war, waging guerrilla campaigns, raids, and flying column attacks that injured the enemy but avoided the decisive confrontation the empire was no longer capable of winning. A century later they began the most sustained, glorious military expansion of their history. This work further sketches the key campaigns, battles, and sieges that illustrate Byzantine military doctrine, vital changes from one era to another, the composition of forces and the major victories and defeats that defined the territory and material well-being of its citizens. Through a summary of their strategies, tactics, and innovations in the tools of war, the book closes with an analysis of the contributions of this remarkable empire to world military history.

This book studies the Sylloge Tacticorum,an important tenth-century Byzantine military manual. The text is used as a case study to connect military manuals with the challenges that Byzantium faced in its wars with the Arabs, but also with other aspects of Byzantine society such as education, politics, and conventions in the productions of literary texts and historical narratives. The book explores when the Syllogewas written and by whom. It identifies which passages from classical or earlier works were incorporated in the Syllogeand explains the reason why Byzantines imitated works of the past. The book then studies the extent to which the Syllogewas original and how innovation and originality were received in Byzantine society. Despite the imitation, the author of the Syllogeadapted and updated his material to reflect the current operational needs as well as the ideological, cultural and religious context of his time. Finally, the book attempts to estimate the extent to which Byzantine generals followed the advice of military manuals, and to explore whether historical narratives can be safely used to draw information as to how the Byzantines and the Arabs fought. Therefore, along with a detailed study of the Sylloge Tacticorum, this monograph also addresses broader issues of the pen and the sword such as military manuals in connection with Byzantine warfare, politics, literature, historiography and education. cultural and religious context of his time. Finally, the book attempts to estimate the extent to which Byzantine generals followed the advice of military manuals, and to explore whether historical narratives can be safely used to draw information as to how the Byzantines and the Arabs fought. Therefore, along with a detailed study of the Sylloge Tacticorum, this monograph also addresses broader issues of the pen and the sword such as military manuals in connection with Byzantine warfare, politics, literature, historiography and education.

The Byzantine Empire was almost always ready to fight, and often fought for its life. During much of its history its provinces were military districts called themes, and acclamation by the army, not coronation or inheritance, was what made a man emperor. The army overthrew twenty-odd rulers, and tried to oust many more. It was large and expensive but on the whole it served its purpose well. Over eight centuries, despite losing a number of battles, the army succeeded in preserving both itself and Byzantium. In view of its importance in Byzantine history, it is surprising that this volume is the first general book on the Byzantine army in any language. The author traces the army's impact on the Byzantine state and society from the army's reorganization under Diocletian (284-305) until its disintegration in the aftermath of the battle of Manzikert (1071). He suggests solutions to some major unresolved questions of Byzantine military history: how big was the army, how was it organized, how much of it was cavalry, how much was it paid, how was it supplied, when and why did it receive land grants in the themes, and why, after surviving so many disasters, did it fail to survive the not particularly disastrous eleventh century?

A collection of eight articles dealing with the relationship between the late Roman and Byzantine state, the society which supported it, and the various ideological and administrative institutions which it evolved. The role and structure of the army are the main focus here.

Warfare, State and Society in the Byznatine World is the first comprehensive study of the warfare and the Byzantine World from the sixth to the twelfth century. The book examines Byzantine attitudes to warfare, the effects of war on society and culture, and the relations between the soldiers, their leaders and society. The communications, logistics, resources and manpower capabilities of the Byzantine Empire are explored to set warfare in its geographical as well as historical context. In addition to the strategic and tactical evolution of the army, this book analyses the army in campaign and in battle, and its attitudes to violence in the context of the Byzantine Orthodox Church.

The emperors of the Komnenian dynasty orchestrated the economic and military renewal of the Byzantine Empire. In 1081, Alexios I became emperor of a bankrupt and diminished empire. In 1180, Manuel I ruled the most powerful state in the eastern Mediterranean, capable of sending expeditions to Egypt, Hungary, Italy, and Palestine. This study examines how the Komnenian emperors restored the Byzantine state by building a professional army of mercenaries and Byzantine citizens. It examines the armys ethnic composition, tactics, equipment, and its financial support. Finally, it examines the army in battle. This is the only study of the Byzantine army during the privotal twelfth century. It provides an explanation for the complex Byzantine political and military problems of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as well as another perspective on the European crusading movement.

Tarihin en büyük savaşlarının ayrıntılı dökümleri, hasım kuvvetlerin stratejileri, taktikleri, askerî harekâtın düğüm noktaları.
Dünyadaki çeşitli orduların üniforma, teçhizat, tarih ve teşkilatı, geçmişleri ve bugünleri.Roma İmparatorluğu sonu gelmez iç savaşlar ve en nihayet kavimler göçü neticesinde büyük sarsıntılara uğradı. İmparatorluğun önce M.S. 395’te ikiye ayrılması ve M.S. 476’da batı yarısının yıkılması Dünya tarihinin dönüm noktalarından biri; Antikçağ’ın sonu ve Ortaçağ’ın başlangıcı olarak kabul edilir. Ne var ki, bizzat o dönemi yaşayanlar açısından, vuku bulan değişimlerin muazzam çapı ve çarpıcılığı aşikâr olmakla beraber bu derece kesin bir kopuş algılanmamıştı. İmparatorluğun ayakta kalan doğu yarısı, Büyük Constantinus’un kurduğu “Yeni Roma” Konstantinopolis’teki merkezinde hayatına devam etmiş; Sasaniler, Avarlar, Bulgarlar ve İslam Halifeliği dâhil onlarca rakibin yüzyıllar süren sayısız saldırılarına göğüs gererek 9. yüzyıl itibarıyla Avrasya’nın süper gücü sıfatını bir defa daha geri kazanmıştı.Önemli Ortaçağ ve Yakındoğu askeri tarihi uzmanlarından Dr. David Nicolle bu eserinde Doğu Roma İmparatorluğu’nun bu hayati önemdeki “olgunlaşma” sürecine bir pencere açarak hem imparatorluk ordularının evrimi; teşkilatı, taktikleri, kıyafeti ve teçhizatına dair aydınlatıcı bilgiler veriyor; hem de Klasik Roma’nın bu Hıristiyan vârisini komşuları, müttefikleri ve rakipleri arasındaki yerine ilgi uyandırıcı sorular da sorarak yerleştiriyor. 20. yüzyılın en yetkin tarih illüstratörlerinden Angus McBride’ın eseri sekiz adet levha ise Doğu Roma savaşçılarını tekrar hayata döndürüyor.

This collection of essays on the Byzantine culture of war in the period between the 4th and the 12th centuries offers a new critical approach to the study of warfare as a fundamental aspect of East Roman society and culture in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The book's main goal is to provide a critical overview of current research as well as new insights into the role of military organization as a distinct form of social power in one of history's more long-lived empires. The various chapters consider the political, ideological, practical, institutional and organizational aspects of Byzantine warfare and place it at the centre of the study of social and cultural history. Contributors are Salvatore Cosentino, Michael Grünbart, Savvas Kyriakidis, Tilemachos Lounghis, Christos Makrypoulias, Stamatina McGrath, Philip Rance, Paul Stephenson, Yannis Stouraitis, Denis Sullivan, and Georgios Theotokis.

Warfare was an integral part of the operations of the medieval eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire, both in its organization, as well as in social thinking and political ideology. This volume presents a selection of articles dealing with key aspects of Byzantine attitudes to war and violence, with military administration and organization at tactical and strategic levels, weapons and armaments and war-making itself; discussions which make an important contribution to answering the questions of how and why the empire survived as long as it did.

By the middle of the sixth century the Byzantine emperor ruled a mighty empire that straddled Europe, Asia and North Africa. Within 100 years, this powerful empire had been cut in half. Two centuries later the Byzantine empire was once again a power to be reckoned with, and soon recovered its position as the paramount East Mediterranean and Balkan power, whose fabulous wealth attracted Viking mercenaries and central Asian nomad warriors to its armies, whose very appearance on the field of battle was sometimes enough to bring enemies to terms. No book has ever attempted a survey of Byzantine wars, and few accounts of Byzantine battles have ever been translated into a modern language. This book will provide essential support for those interested in Byzantine history in general as well as a useful corrective to the more usual highly romanticised views of Byzantine civilisation.

This book examines the strategies and military tactics of the Byzantines and their enemies in Eastern Anatolia, Syria and in Upper Mesopotamia in the tenth century.

Siege Warfare follows the adaptation of late Roman military organization among successor states to 800 AD from Francia to the Caliphate, as siege technology, military infrastructure and administrative techniques throughout the Mediterranean derived from 4th and 5th century imperial innovations.

This volume examines the development and evolution of the war galley known as the Dromon, and its relative, the Chelandion, from first appearance in the sixth century until its supercession in the twelfth century by the Galea developed in the Latin West. Beginning as a small, fully-decked, monoreme galley, by the tenth century the Dromon had become a bireme, the pre-eminent war galley of the Mediterranean. The salient features of these ships were their two-banked oarage system, the spurs at their bows which replaced the ram of classical antiquity, their lateen sails, and their primary weapon: Greek Fire.
The book contextualizes the technical characteristics of the ships within the operational history of Byzantine fleets, logistical problems of medieval naval warfare, and strategic objectives.
Surviving Byzantine sources, especially tactical manuals, are subjected to close literary and philological analysis.

When maritime transport and communication depended on muscle and wind-power, the Mediterranean Sea functioned as a symbiotic force between the civilisations which surrounded it, at once the major dividing barrier and the major connecting element. In this study, the technological limitations of maritime traffic are considered in conjunction with the peculiar geographical conditions within which it operated, and which led to the establishment of major sea lanes on trunk routes along which traffic could move safely, efficiently, and economically. These trunk routes remained virtually unchanged from antiquity to the sixteenth century, and eventually constituted economic and strategic maritime frontiers between civilisations. At the same time, the technological limitations of the oared galley meant that coasts and islands along the trunk routes had also to be held, a necessity which favoured geographically the Christian West over the world of Byzantium and Islam.

The Taktika, ascribed to the hand of the Byzantine emperor Leo VI "the Wise" (886-912), is perhaps one of the best-known middle Byzantine texts of an official or semi-official genre. Presented in the form of a book of guidance for provincial generals, it served as both a statement of imperial authority and power, as well as a reminder of earlier "good practice" and the centrality of the values of a Christian society in the struggle against its enemies. In particular, the Taktika identified Islam, for the first time, as a fundamental threat to the very existence of the Christian Roman Empire and Christianity itself. Yet despite its significance for the history of Byzantine administration, culture, language, and society, no study has ever been devoted to this fascinating text. John Haldon offers the first critical commentary to appear in any language, addressing in detail the many varied subjects touched on in the treatise itself and accompanied by three introductory chapters that examine the context, sources, language, structure and content of the text, as well as the military administration of the empire in Leo's time.